Fed Study: Investor Speculation & the Bubble

Very convenient for the Fed to have this opinion, basically blamethe investors and home buyers. In this way the regulators bear no responsibility. And in omitting this detail the Fed absolved itself. The study also apparently leaves out the unchecked growth of the shadow banking system where the originators interests were no longer aligned with the home buyer(e.g. the system changed so that wall street no longer had an interest in the loans actually performing). In Harry Potter's day the lender had skiin in the game. The Fed was in a position to realize this change was taking place and had an obligation to raise the issue and see it addressed. But I guess the Fed didn't want to be the one to turn off the music and take away the champagne.

While home buyers and buyers of debt had a role here, that is only part of the story, what was different
in post 2000 housing was the new role of the shadow banking system and
unregulated home lending.

Jim Wilkinson: Wall St started bundling homeowner loans together, mortgage back securities and selling slices of those bundles to investors and they were making big money. So they started pushing the lenders saying %u201CCom%u2019on, we need more loans%u201D
Henry Paulson: The lenders are already giving loans to borrowers with good credit so they go bottom feeding and they lower the criteria.
Ayad Akhtar: Before, you needed a credit score of 620 and down payment of 20%. Now they settle for 500, no money down
Jim Wilkinson: And the buyer, the regular guy in the streets assumes the expert know what they were doing. He%u2019s saying to himself %u201CThe banks are willing to loan me money, I must be able to afford it%u201D So he reaches for the American dream. He buys that house.

Ayad Akhtar : The banks knew the securities based on sh%tbag mortgages were risky.
Henry Paulson: You%u2019ll work on Sh%tbag

Ayad Akhtar: So to control the downside, the banks started to buy the kind of insurance: If mortgages defaults, insurance companies pays: Default swap. The banks insured their potential losses to move their risk off their books so they can invest more, make more money

Henry Paulson : Well a lot of companies insure their stuff; one company is dumb enough to take on almost unbelievable amount risk
Michele Davis : AIG

Jim Wilkinson : And.. you%u2019ll work on dumb

Michele Davis : And when they ask me why they did that?
Jim Wilkinson :Fees.
Ayad Akhtar : Hundreds of millions in fees

Henry Paulson : AIG figures the housing market would just keep going up then the unexpected happened
Jim Wilkinson : Housing prices go down
Ayad Akhtar : Poor bastard who bought his dream house, the teaser rate on his mortgage runs out, his payment goes up, he defaults
Henry Paulson : Mortgage back securities tanks, AIG has to pay off the swaps, all of them, all over the world, at the same time

Ayad Akhtar : AIG can%u2019t pay, AIG goes under, every banks the insure books massive losses at the same day and then they all go under, it all comes down

Michele Davis : The whole financial system? And what do I say when they asked me why it wasn%u2019t regulated.
Henry Paulson : No one wanted to; they were making too much money

Truthskr10: So Henry, where was the FED in all this? In everyone's pocket?
Henry: We're working on everyone's pocket.

Jim Wilkinson: Wall St started bundling homeowner loans together, mortgage back securities and selling slices of those bundles to investors and they were making big money. So they started pushing the lenders saying, "Come on, we need more loans."
Henry Paulson: The lenders are already giving loans to borrowers with good credit so they go bottom feeding and they lower the criteria.
Ayad Akhtar: Before, you needed a credit score of 620 and down payment of 20%. Now they settle for 500, no money down
Jim Wilkinson: And the buyer, the regular guy in the streets assumes the expert know what they were doing. He's saying to himself "The banks are willing to loan me money, I must be able to afford it" So he reaches for the American dream. He buys that house.

Ayad Akhtar : The banks knew the securities based on sh%tbag mortgages were risky.
Henry Paulson: You'll work on Sh%tbag

Ayad Akhtar: So to control the downside, the banks started to buy the kind of insurance: If mortgages defaults, insurance companies pays: Default swap. The banks insured their potential losses to move their risk off their books so they can invest more, make more money

Henry Paulson : Well a lot of companies insure their stuff; one company is dumb enough to take on almost unbelievable amount risk
Michele Davis : AIG

Jim Wilkinson : And.. you'll work on dumb

Michele Davis : And when they ask me why they did that?
Jim Wilkinson :Fees.
Ayad Akhtar : Hundreds of millions in fees

Henry Paulson : AIG figures the housing market would just keep going up then the unexpected happened
Jim Wilkinson : Housing prices go down
Ayad Akhtar : Poor bastard who bought his dream house, the teaser rate on his mortgage runs out, his payment goes up, he defaults
Henry Paulson : Mortgage back securities tanks, AIG has to pay off the swaps, all of them, all over the world, at the same time

Ayad Akhtar : AIG can't pay, AIG goes under, every banks the insure books massive losses at the same day and then they all go under, it all comes down

Michele Davis : The whole financial system? And what do I say when they asked me why it wasn't regulated.
Henry Paulson : No one wanted to; they were making too much money

Truthskr10: So Henry, where was the FED in all this? In everyone's pocket?
Henry: We're working on everyone's pocket.

sorry for the double post.

BTW, can someone explain to me (in layman terms) why the US dollar hasnt strengthened against the Euro.
The drama in europe should have put the dollar down to at least $1.20 against the Euro.

yeah. i'd like to know this too.

generally, because the market has priced in a discount to the euro already given all the turmoil but its likely that the euro has another 10-20% down in the medium term if the market doesn't think the rescue plan is credible. even with all the recent hoopla, that is still an open question.

on a longer term basis (next 6-9 mos) there could be another significant leg down (20% or more) if there is an indication the euro doesn't hold. very unlikely scenario but more likely than three months ago. better transparency on that possibility in the next 3-6 months.

Truth

I am not a currency expert by any means, but i would say that it is holding its value because of shorts.
Any time it starts to sell off, shorts cover..

the euro vs. dollar trade is the deepest market out there, shorts have little impact other than momentary spikes in trading activity.

Henry Paulson : AIG figures the housing market would just keep going up then the unexpected happened

At that point in time, what ever Alan Greenspan said was Gospel. And, he said that RE prices have never gone done on a National basis. No one listened to his qualifying statement... "since the great depression". Hard to stop the hurd. All wanted to believe they would keep going up because ALL were prospering off it.. Granted, some more than others. but everyone was reaping the rewards. That is a point everyone seems to forget!

Notice is does not blame Fannie and Freddie. Notice no such report (any of the investment banks, the CBO, BIS, etc.) says those two were the driving force. The research notes from the i-banks strangely blame THEMSELVES (the i-banks collectively) not Fannie and Freddie. In case someone was going to try and make that argument.

I've moved away from the Fannie/Freddie argument. Fannie/Freddie was more of a story of greed by the executives and over-leveraged and chasing market share after seeing growth of sub-prime and alt-a. I don't believe they leading the charge here, but chasing it. Fannie and Freddie not blameless, but neither were they a lead contributor.

fed is bunch of crooks run by rockefeller, morgan, goldman sachs, and the rothschilds

" and the rothschilds"

ooooh i hope it's the cute one, David, and not that funny looking one, Nathaniel! which one is it? do you know?

and the rothschilds....
------------------------
you jumped the shark there and went anti-semite..
nice going..

i have yet to speak to anyone who mentions "the Rothschilds" and their vast, pure evilness who could actually name one single living Rothschild.

What about the Koch brothers, the Waltons, and Buffet who has interests on numerous banks, insurance companies, and reinsurance companies?

In the literature of bigots, the name Rothschild is a trigger for the most explosive of anti-Semitic tremors, and it usually sets off a litany of other Jewish names. In his recent book Called to Serve, Col. James "Bo" Gritz, the 1992 Presidential candidate of the extremist Populist Party, charged that "eight Jewish families control the FED" (Federal Reserve System).

In 1983, the charge that Rothschild banks and other international banking concerns, mostly with Jewish names, controlled the Federal Reserve was published (probably from earlier sources) in the newsletter of a local Pennsylvania chapter of the National Association of Retired Federal Employees (NARFE) — not an extremist group. The article stated that the Federal Reserve System "is not a Federal entity but a private corporation owned in part by the following: Rothschild banks of London and Berlin, Lazard Brothers bank of Paris, Israel Moses Seif banks of Italy, Warburg bank of Hamburg and Amsterdam, Lehman Bros. bank of New York, Chase Manhattan bank of New York, Kuhn, Loeb bank of New York, Goldman Sachs bank of New York."

http://www.adl.org/special_reports/control_of_fed/fed_rothschild.asp

"Koch brothers, the Waltons, and Buffet"

as soon as their names become a rallying cry for ethnic hatred against people of their backgrounds, i will be sure to register my disapproval.

"Very convenient for the Fed to have this opinion, basically blamethe investors and home buyers. In this way the regulators bear no responsibility. And in omitting this detail the Fed absolved itself."

It's as if you didn't read the report. Here's the conclusion:

"But what, if anything, does it teach us about policy? We conclude that it’s very important for lenders (and regulators) to manage leverage as asset bubbles are inflating. In the 2000s, securitized nonprime credit emerged to allow leverage to increase, with effects that extended far beyond this sector, including spillovers from defaulted mortgages to the value of other properties (see Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak [2009]). Effective regulation of speculative borrowing, like what is being attempted in China today, may be needed to prevent this kind of crisis from recurring."

I saw it, was buried at the bottom. The Fed seems to be lack of regulation was not responsible, but could be preventative going forward. They're clearly have a reason to be biased. Would the police ever blame themselves for escalating crime... probably not.

where would you present the conclusion?

The report very clearly states that it's important for regulators to manage leverage as asset bubbles are inflating, and that effective regulation of speculative borrowing may be needed. In their own words.

Please tell me where these authors state that a lack of regulation was not responsible. You seem to have a pre-formed opinion of what you'd like them to be stating based on some preconceived notion of what employees of the Fed should believe.

As far as people acknowledging blame for the part they played in the bubble, what about you? Don't your beliefs in the normalcy of home price appreciation beyond inflation contribute to the bubble?

The Fed study should have been about the regulations or lack there and formation and propagation of asset bubbles. Fed would have to bite the bullet on that one, since it's a common belief that monetary policy and financial regulation are opposing concepts. This was expressed most recently by former Obama and Clinton official and well known expert genius Larry Summers who suggested reducing mortgage requirements and regulation as a way of healing the housing mess.

As far as people acknowledging blame for the part they played in the bubble, what about you? Don't your beliefs in the normalcy of home price appreciation beyond inflation contribute to the bubble?

An expectation or assumption that an asset may be expected to outperform CPI by 1-2% over a 20 year period is hardly bubble mentality. Straw horse?

FLMAOZzzzzzzzz... 200bps over CPI, mix in leverage of 3x, then 5x, then 10x, then 20x and to infinity and beyond with HELOCs....... just fking shove that straw horse up your azz rivershitter.

FLMAOZzzzz...

Tack, fking tack... goddammmmmmittttt.. .tack this boat over NOW!

welcome back. its not been the same without you.

YO HO HO!
Welcome back to port W67!
Ready for some salty tales of adventure.

"The Fed study should have been about the regulations or lack there and formation and propagation of asset bubbles. "

Ah yes, ignore the question.

"An expectation or assumption that an asset may be expected to outperform CPI by 1-2% over a 20 year period is hardly bubble mentality. Straw horse?"

Heh, I guess it's only 1-2% now. Diminished expectations and all.

Take a look at this graph that covers 120 years:

http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2011/04/case-shiller-100-year-chart-2011-update

If 1-2% increases beyond inflation were the norm, it be up 3.3x to 10.8x. But it ain't. And for good economic reasons. Your 1-2% expectations are a pipe dream. A much-diminished pipe dream, but a pipe dream nevertheless.

Now if you're saying that after a cyclical downturn one can expect 1-2% beyond inflation to make up for lost ground, I can get behind that. For example, 1995: the SE index was at 700, inflation takes it to 1050, it should be at 1400 after inflation plus 2%. But we're staring at 1900. Now you want another 2% beyond inflation for the next 20 years. That'd put it at 2850, 2.7x the inflation-adjusted value of 1995.

Now take a look at that chart and tell me what happened last time we had a 2.7x increase over 40 years. Oh wait, it's never happened. Not even at the peak of this bubble that the Fed took no steps to tame. Yet there it is, still your expectations.

Oh shit! Riversider don't rnderstand rhe roncept rf rompounding. Rlmaoz.

You falco. :)

So it begins my friend. The Great unwinding of the greatest re bubble. Unemployment hit 8.6%, QE3 is off the table, euro to struggle for 2 more years, day on reckonening for china re bubble.... Bernie's got cover to crank up interest rates soon. I wondered how that will affect leveraged asset prices? Don't ask Riversider he can't do math, but he can sure collect that SS chks. He's happy as a kitten this year, COLA for him went up3%!!!!!! Flmaozzz

Ino, I understand you prefer financial assets(stocks) over real estate, preferring to buy based on forward operating earnings ignoring companies are way above trend in profitablility and ignoring cycle in earings or looking at a ten year average of earnings and the effect of discontinued businesses...

So while you scoff at 1% inflation adjusted returns and prefer stocks, keep in mind that stocks are only priced to return around 4.5% nominal over the next ten years(including dividends). Those aren't my numbers but Jeremy Grantham and John Hussman's.

Jeremy Grantham = biggest bear around. I think he has an interesting perspective but his numbers for equity returns have to be on the low end of the scale.

not just a bear, intelligent risk averse bear.

"So while you scoff at 1% inflation adjusted returns and prefer stocks, keep in mind that stocks are only priced to return around 4.5% nominal over the next ten years(including dividends). Those aren't my numbers but Jeremy Grantham and John Hussman's."

Genius, I am not scoffing at 1-2% inflation-adjusted returns as being too low. I am saying that your expectation of that from RE is unwarranted economically, backed by 120 years of history (or 400 years if you include the data on the block of houses in Amsterdam). Yet you operate under bubble assumptions (now much-diminished) of RE gains beyond inflation. Yet you refuse to look at your own attitude as a source of the bubble.

BTW, if stocks return 4.5% annually over the next decade, I can live with that 55% gain. The fact that is the "intelligent risk averse bear" perspective is pretty good IMO. The "intelligent risk averse bull" perspective (e.g., Buffett) is probably closer to double that.

You wanna know the "intelligent bear" prognosis on NYC RE over the next decade? Down 20% nominally. The intelligent bulls are at up 20% nominally. With a 20% downpayment, the latter will leave you flat w.r.t. renting while the former has you at a 200% loss.

But you go on and continue to believe in the fairy of 2% RE increases beyond inflation forever. To infinity and beyond! (But no bubble here.)

So equities can outperform inflation but not real estate? Interesting

From 1890- to the bubble, the inflation adjusted (real)return of real estate was 0.60% apx
from 1950- to the bubble, the inflation adjusted (real)return was 1.24%.

It's not a stretch to expect a modest outperformanc assuming a long stretch going forward. And since real estate has corrected there's a decent chance it does the higher end of that number 1-2%

of course feel free to cite your own stats..

RE "is correcting". To say it "has corrected" is a stretch.

HB:

Of course equities can and regularly do outperform inflation: they reflect a claim on the economy and the economy is growing in real terms.

Real estate, on the other hand, reflects a claim on a material object that wears out, while replacements get cheaper over time as building techniques get more productive.

To believe that RE should go up faster than inflation long run you need to believe that building techniques don't improve or that the market is fundamentally broken. Or, with RS, that the fairy godmother guarantees all good things to those who wish, regardless of basic market dynamics.

"From 1890- to the bubble, the inflation adjusted (real)return of real estate was 0.60% apx
from 1950- to the bubble, the inflation adjusted (real)return was 1.24%."

Let me get this straight. You look at this chart:

http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2011/04/case-shiller-100-year-chart-2011-update

You see that it is flat around a level of 100 for an entire century except the decade surrounding the bubble centered at 2006. You see how returns were 0% 1890-1996. But you take the peak level of 205 from 2006 known as "the top of the bubble", compare that to the 1950 level of 105, and call that 1.24% a great baseline for your proclamation of 1-2% as "reasonable"? Why stop there? Why not just use 1996-2006 as "normal" and call the 7% a year as a baseline for 5-10% as normal?

"The Great unwinding of the greatest re bubble."

Yes. There's so much sheet going down in so many places & in so many ways. So, W67, kindly prognosticate on nyc re & us/world economy.

80% of mortgage fraud is not by the borrowers but by the banks/lenders
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The FBI reports that equity stripping and property flipping are common activities. This problem is
compounded in instances where an institution has ineffective policies and procedures that are poorly
formulated or outdated. The FBI estimates that 80 percent of all mortgage fraud involves collaboration
or collusion by industry insiders. Overall though, according to an FBI Financial Institution Fraud and
Failure Report, external fraud schemes outnumber those involving insiders due to the following:
 Pervasiveness of check fraud and counterfeit negotiable instrument schemes.
 Technological advances.
 The availability of personal information through illicit information networks.
http://www.ots.treas.gov/_files/74874.pdf

Loan Origination Schemes

Mortgage loan origination fraud is divided into two categories: fraud for property/housing and fraud for profit. Fraud for property/housing entails misrepresentations by the applicant for the purpose of purchasing a property for a primary residence. This scheme usually involves a single loan. Although applicants may embellish income and conceal debt, their intent is to repay the loan. Fraud for profit, however, often involves multiple loans and elaborate schemes perpetrated to gain illicit proceeds from property sales. Gross misrepresentations concerning appraisals and loan documents are common in fraud for profit schemes, and participants are frequently paid for their participation.

Loan origination fraud schemes remain a constant fraud scheme. These schemes involve falsifying a borrower’s financial information––such as income, assets, liabilities, employment, rent, and occupancy status––to qualify the buyer, who otherwise would be ineligible, for a mortgage loan. This is done by supplying fictitious bank statements, W-2 forms, and tax return documents to the borrower’s favor. Perpetrators may also employ the use of stolen identities. Specific schemes used to falsify information include asset rental, backwards application, and credit enhancement schemes.

Freddie Mac is reporting that the loan origination frauds they are witnessing include false documents, property flips with phantom rehabilitation, fictitious assets, and fabricated payroll documents.46 Fraudsters are also using phantom rehabilitations to increase the property values. However, Freddie Mac has been interviewing borrowers and their neighbors to determine if the rehabilitations are actually occurring. Also, Freddie Mac is reporting that fraudsters continue to use transactional “lenders” such as the “dough for a day” businesses that “loan” potential borrowers money so that underwriters will see they have assets when conducting their “proof of funds” due diligence risk assessment on the loan application.

Backwards Application Scheme

In a backwards application scheme, the mortgage fraud perpetrator fabricates the unqualified borrower’s income and assets to meet the loan’s minimum application requirements. Incomes are inflated or falsified, assets are created, credit reports are altered, and previous residences are altered to qualify the borrower for the loan.

Fraudulently Inflated Appraisals

Mortgage fraud perpetrators fraudulently inflate property appraisals during the mortgage loan origination process to generate false equity that they will later abscond. Perpetrators will either falsify the appraisal document or employ a rogue appraiser as a conspirator in the scheme who will create and attest to the inflated value of the property. Fraudulent appraisals often include overstated comparable properties to increase the value of the subject property.

Illegal Property Flipping

Illegal property flipping is a complex fraud that involves the purchase and subsequent resale of property at greatly inflated prices. The key to this scheme is the fraudulent appraisal, which occurs prior to selling the property. The artificially inflated property value enables the purchaser to obtain a greater loan than would otherwise be possible. Subsequently, a buyer purchases the property at the inflated rate. The difference between what the perpetrator paid for the property and the final purchase price of the home is the perpetrator’s profit.

Traditionally, any exchange of property occurring twice on the same day is considered highly suspect for illegal property flipping and often is accompanied by back-to-back closings where there is a purchase contract and a sales contract that are both presented to the same title company. FBI combined intelligence and case reporting for FY 2010 indicates that property flipping is occurring in 47 out of 56 field office territories. The fraud continues to involve the use of fraudulent bank statements, W-2s, and pay stubs; the use of straw buyer investors to purchase distressed properties for alleged rehabilitation; perpetrators receiving cash-back at closing; and the failure to make the first mortgage payment. This type of fraud often results in foreclosure. FBI information indicates the top 10 states reporting same-day property flips (as recorded by county clerk’s offices throughout the United States) in 2010 were Florida, Ohio, Georgia, Minnesota, Hawaii, Michigan, Tennessee, New York, Maryland, and Washington.

Among other industry sources reporting significant property flipping, Interthinx reports that it is still prevalent and trending upward.47 Current property flipping schemes reported by Interthinx involve fraud against servicers; piggybacking on bank accounts to qualify for mortgages; and forgeries. HUD reporting indicates the use of limited liability companies (LLCs) to perpetrate fraudulent property flipping.48
Title/Escrow/Settlement Fraud/Non-Satisfaction of Mortgage

A review of FBI cases opened in 2010 indicates that 38 percent of FBI field offices are reporting some form of title/escrow/settlement fraud. The majority of these frauds involve the diversion or embezzlement of funds for uses other than those specified in the lender’s closing instructions. Associated schemes include the failure to satisfy/pay off mortgage loans after closings for refinances; the reconveyance or transfer of property without the homeowner’s knowledge or consent; the failure to record closing documents such as property deeds; the recording of deeds without title insurance but charging the homeowner and absconding with the money; the use of settlement funds intended to pay subcontractors by general contractors to pay debts on previous projects; the use of dry closings; the delayed recording of loans; the filing of fraudulent liens to receive cash at closing; and the distribution of settlement funds among co-conspirators.

According to a review of FBI investigations opened in FY 2010, title agents and settlement attorneys in at least 21 investigations in 14 field office territories are involved in non-satisfaction of mortgage schemes. They are engaged in misappropriating and embezzling more than $27 million in settlement funds for their own personal use rather than using those escrowed funds to satisfy/pay off mortgages as directed per lender instructions provided at closing. Perpetrators diverted escrow monies intended for lenders to themselves or to entities that they controlled. In addition to embezzling escrow funds, perpetrators are also falsifying deeds, recording deeds without title insurance, and failing to record deeds and taxes.

Real Estate Investment Schemes

In a real estate investment scheme, mortgage fraud perpetrators persuade investors or borrowers to purchase investment properties generally at fraudulently inflated values. Borrowers are persuaded to purchase rental properties or land under the guise of quick appreciation. Victim borrowers pay artificially inflated prices for these investment properties and, as a result, experience a personal financial loss when the true value is later discovered. Analysis of FBI cases opened in FY 2010 revealed that 43 percent of FBI field offices are reporting this activity with losses exceeding $76 million.

Short Sale Schemes

A real estate short sale is a type of pre-foreclosure sale in which the lender agrees to sell a property for less than the mortgage owed. Short sale fraud consists of false statements made to loan servicers or lenders that take the form of buyer or seller affirmations of no hidden relationships or agreements in place to resell the property, typically for a period of 90 days. One of the most common forms of a short sale scheme occurs when the subject is alleged to be purchasing foreclosed properties via short sale, but not submitting the “best offer” to the lender and subsequently selling the property in a dual closing the same day or within a short time frame for a significant profit. Reverse staging and comparable shopping techniques are currently being used by fraud perpetrators in the commission of short sale frauds. The fraud primarily occurs in areas of the country that are experiencing high rates of foreclosure or homeowner distress.

Industry participants are reporting that short sale fraud schemes continue to be an increasing threat to the mortgage industry. A recent CoreLogic study indicated that short sale volume has tripled from 2009 to 2010.49 In June 2010, Freddie Mac reported that short sale transactions were up 700 percent compared to 2008.

Industry sources report that in the process of committing short sale fraud, fraudsters are manipulating the Broker Price Opinions (BPOs) and MLS; engaging in non-arms-length transactions;50 using LLCs to hide their involvement in short sale transactions;51 failing to record short sale deeds of trust; using back-to-back and multiple real estate agent closings; selling properties to an LLC or trust months before the sale;52 selling the property to a family member or other party the fraudsters control and deeding the property back to themselves; engaging in escrow thefts, simultaneous double sales to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and failing to pay off the original loan in a refinance transaction; property flopping;53 bribing brokers and appraisers; refusing to allow the broker or appraiser access to the property unless the fraudster is present; providing their own comparables to the appraiser; taking unflattering photographs of the property and pointing out defects in the property to the appraiser;54 providing false estimates of repair, rebuttal of appraisal, and selection of poor comparable properties;55 and facilitating the partnership of attorneys with non-attorneys to split fees acquired during short sale negotiations.56

http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/mortgage-fraud-2010

"The Great unwinding of the greatest re bubble."

Yes. There's so much sheet going down in so many places & in so many ways. So, W67, kindly prognosticate on nyc re & us/world economy.

======

Second that one! come on w67th, illuminate us.

on the other hand, the FED will never acknowledge their blame, nor will politicians pushing for the ownership BS nor most voters that were homeowners at the time and are still in RE-rehab.